Who rules Iran? Iranian ambitions. by Gandolfo,  K. Luisa & Molavi, Reza
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
29 July 2010
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Gandolfo, K. Luisa and Molavi, Reza (2010) ’Who rules Iran ? Iranian ambitions.’, Middle East quarterly., 17
(1). pp. 61-68.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.meforum.org/2586/who-rules-iran
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
First published as: Iranian Ambitions: Who Rules Iran? by Reza Molavi and K. Luisa Gandolfo, Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2010, pp. 61-68.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Who Rules Iran? 
Iranian Ambitions 
by Reza Molavi and K. Luisa Gandolfo 
Middle East Quarterly 
Winter 2010, pp. 61-68 
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In the 30-year reign of Iran's Islamic Republic, there have been few controversies as serious as the one 
surrounding the 2009 elections. The votes that brought Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power for a second term 
have been challenged, not just on paper, but by citizens taking to the streets in angry protests that have only 
been quelled by brute force on the part of the establishment. Less well known is the upset that followed 
Ahmadinejad's nepotistic appointment of Esfandiar Rahim Masha'i, the father of his daughter-in-law, to the 
post of first vice president. Not long after this, Iran's supreme leader, 'Ali Khamenei, demonstrated his personal 
authority over the entire political system by forcing Ahmadinejad to reconsider his appointee, leading to 
Masha'i's dismissal. Masha'i had become controversial for his impolitic references to Israel and America. In a 
speech at a tourism convention in July 2008, for example, he had observed: "Not only we have no enemy, but 
we are friends with the American people, with the Israeli people, and we are proud that we are friendly with all 
the nations in the world."[1] 
How did this happen? How did a man holding such 
views on two countries regarded throughout Iran as 
the Great and Lesser Satan come to such an important 
public position? Was something less obvious going 
on? Why was it so important for Khamenei to risk 
such a public censure of the president? 
It is hard to know just what Masha'i intended by his 
original remarks since they were overtaken so quickly 
by condemnation and denial. In themselves, they are 
of little importance since they clearly did not mark 
any change in emphasis for Iranian foreign policy. It 
is the incident in its entirety that is of importance, in 
what it says about the workings of the regime, above 
all the relationship between the supreme leader and 
the president. 
Why Masha'i? 
Masha'i was born in November 1960 in the Caspian 
Sea resort town of Ramsar. His ability to memorize 
the Qur'an and recite it at religious functions from the early age of fifteen allowed him to develop his skills as 
an orator. By the time of the revolution, Masha'i was eighteen and was already organizing marches against the 
shah and distributing Ayatollah Khomeini's decrees and instructions. Upon graduation with an electronics 
engineering degree from Esfahan Technical University (Daneshgah-e San'ati-ye Esfahan), he joined the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) security services. His first posting took him to Kurdistan. While there, 
Masha'i had the opportunity to meet Ahmadinejad who was then governor of Khoy in western Azerbaijan. Over 
the years, Masha'i held several posts at the Ministry of the Interior, then as director of Radio Payam, as director 
of Radio Tehran, and in the national radio and television service. Finally, he was tapped by Ahmadinejad, then 
mayor of Tehran, to serve as his social and cultural deputy. During Masha'i's term as deputy mayor of Tehran it 
is rumored that Ahmadinejad became infatuated with him and his apocalyptic ideas. Both Masha'i's connections 
with the Revolutionary Guards' security forces and his continued involvement in the repression of the Kurds 
remained as part of his portfolio for several years even when he rose to high office as first vice president.
Esfandiar Rahim Masha'i (L) joins Iranian president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, July 29, 2009. During Masha'i's term as 
Tehran's deputy mayor, Ahmadinejad became infatuated with 
him and his apocalyptic ideas. But a controversy erupted after 
Ahmadinejad later appointed him first vice president. Masha'i 
was forced to resign at Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei's 
insistence.
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Moreover, Masha'i's daughter is married to Ahmadinejad's son, a union that emerged after years of close 
friendship between the two families. The association denotes a predilection for domestic connections: Just as 
Ahmadinejad appointed Masha'i to the post of first vice president (there being ten vice presidents in all), so too, 
he named his son-in-law, Mehdi Khorshidi, chief of staff—a role Masha'i would take soon after his dismissal 
from the vice presidency. 
The Israel Controversy 
Masha'i's appointment generated controversy on the one hand because of the way in which it was made, and, on 
the other, because of a remark almost calculated to arouse anger in a wide section of the Iranian public and the 
political leadership. With what seems in hindsight to have been extraordinary naiveté, he commented publicly 
on the nature of Israeli-Iranian relations. 
Calling the American and Israeli people "friends" engendered apoplexy among clerics and politicians alike. 
Two hundred deputies wrote to Ahmadinejad condemning Masha'i's remarks, and Iran's parliament speaker, Ali 
Larijani, criticized the statements independently.[2] Students protested outside Masha'i's office, calling for his 
dismissal.[3] Masha'i had identified himself with a level of liberalism that could not be tolerated in a regime 
already under threat from reformists. For the Union of Islamic Students Societies, the removal of Masha'i was a 
crucial condition for the fundamentalist cause, as outlined in a missive to the vice president himself: "While 
reaffirming our support for Mr. Ahmadinejad, the best choice for president, we believe that your immediate 
resignation from the post of vice president would be the only way to serve fundamentalism." Should he refuse 
to comply, there would be severe repercussions: "You will be on the receiving end of the dire consequences of 
this appointment."[4] Masha'i reiterated: "I will repeat this a thousand more times, that we love the people of 
Israel, and I am not afraid of anybody saying that."[5] 
But, according to Iranian state radio, on the day following his original remarks, he performed a complete about-
face, saying, "This is not what I meant and these are all lies. During my speech I also said that Israel was dead 
and only its funeral ceremony has been postponed, but they [the press] did not publish these statements."[6] 
He made this clearer later that same day, with two related statements: 
By "Israel" I meant the Palestinian and Jewish people living in Palestine, not the immigrant Jews or 
Zionists because we do not recognize the Zionists at all.[7] 
It is obvious that Iran cannot be friendly with Zionist usurpators [sic]. Everyone should have 
understood that I made a mistake by saying we are friendly with the Israeli people while I had the 
Palestinians in mind … however, as stated by our dear president several time, Iranians have no 
enmity with the American or the Jewish people, which we distinguish from the Zionists who 
occupied Palestinian's homeland.[8] 
Given the alacrity with which he reversed his position, his original statement may have been less significant 
than commentators have led us to believe. Clearly, something else was happening from the start. If Masha'i's 
initial remarks signaled a significant departure from the rhetoric customarily issued from Iran, then the response 
by Ahmadinejad at a subsequent press conference was just as remarkable. It is important to remember that 
Ahmadinejad has created a reputation for himself as an uncompromisingly anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist 
politician. His many statements of hostility toward Jews and Israel have acquired notoriety on the world stage. 
For example, on October 26, 2005, he said "Our dear imam [Khomeini] ordered that this Jerusalem-occupying 
regime must be erased from the page of time. This was a very wise statement. … Soon this stain of disgrace 
will be cleaned from the garment of the world of Islam, and this is attainable."[9] 
Ahmadinejad made a suitably ambiguous statement in response to Masha'i's pro-Israeli sentiments. The 
ambiguity allowed Ahmadinejad the luxury of demonstrating solidarity with his colleague without departing 
from the official line. His statement also opened a way for Masha'i to make the shift in position he so quickly 
did: "Masha'i's word," said Ahmadinejad, "is the administration's word, and it is very clear. Our nation has no 
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problem with people and nations."[10] Although surprising, Ahmadinejad's stance was not unusual, and the 
events of 2008 were ultimately to prove a prelude for Masha'i's appointment and the ensuing debate the 
following year. 
Ahmadinejad's Standing 
Masha'i's appointment generated an outrage that has emphasized the fragile political balance that Ahmadinejad 
must now strike between extremist organizations and those others who have rendered smooth his professional 
passage. It also brought into the open the strain in relations between the president as head of state and the 
supreme leader as the religious leader and overriding authority in the regime. Ahmadinejad's task is not easy. 
As a neo-fundamentalist and arch-conservative, he has to carry on a balancing act that will allow him to gain 
acceptance from the reformist wings of the Iranian state and society. When he was mayor of Tehran, for 
example, he imposed a religious hard line through which he reversed the reforms that had been instituted by 
previous moderate mayors. As president, he also came with a mission to roll back the reforms of former 
presidents such as Mohammad Khatami. His main power base, apart from the Revolutionary Guard Corps, is 
the I'tilaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami (Association of the Developers of Islamic Iran), within which he is one 
of the most prominent figures.[11] The I'tilaf is one of Iran's most important bastions of conservatism and is so 
far to the right that it has been described as a fascist movement. Without its support, it is unlikely that 
Ahmadinejad would have been elected for the first or second time. His far-right position gave him little 
flexibility with religious and political moderates. In 2005, many of his cabinet nominations were rejected by the 
parliament.[12] 
Again, following Masha'i's selection, support for Ahmadinejad was less than forthcoming; for example, the 
reformist lawmaker Dariush Ghanbari said of the appointment: "Now lawmakers can question Ahmadinejad or 
even impeach him for this appointment."[13] Much of the concern rests on Ahmadinejad's autocratic nature: 
Instead of consulting the deputies before choosing his cabinet, Ahmadinejad handed the position directly to 
Masha'i, a move that elicited "shock" from the conservative parliament speaker Ali Larijani.[14] Likewise, the 
departure of the minister of information, Hujjat al-Islam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje'i, is said to have 
followed a verbal confrontation with Ahmadinejad over Masha'i's appointment.[15] 
Ahmadinejad and Masha'i remained indifferent in the face of strident objections—an indifference that 
compelled Khamenei to formally request Masha'i's removal by Ahmadinejad. On July 21, the supreme leader 
wrote to his president: "The appointment of Esfandiar Rahim Masha'i to the post of deputy president is contrary 
to your interest and that of your government, and it will cause division and frustration for your supporters … 
We must cancel this appointment."[16] That the supreme leader's unspoken criticisms passed unacknowledged 
by the president until they were conveyed through a handwritten letter raised questions among traditional 
conservative allies of Ahmadinejad as to whether the student was ignoring the voice of his master. 
Nevertheless, Khamenei got his way in the end. Masha'i tendered his written resignation, stating: "Obeying the 
orders of the supreme leader, I do not see myself to be the first vice president but … I will serve our dear 
people as best I can."[17] Yet, Ahmadinejad's perceived insolence in the face of Khamenei's request angered 
many clerics, Majlis parliament members, theologians, and the conservative media alike. Ahmadinejad greeted 
early suggestions that Masha'i should resign by asking, "Why should he resign? Masha'i has been appointed as 
the first vice president and continues his activities in the government."[18] This hinted at an attempt by 
Ahmadinejad to assert personal whims over the wishes of the supreme leader. 
Yet the resignation when it came, did not mark the end of the silent antagonism. Ahmadinejad waited one week 
before passing the resignation letter to Khamenei, along with a brief correspondence that acknowledged the 
demands of protocol: "Peace be upon you. While sending you a copy of the resignation letter of Mr. (Engineer) 
Esfandiar Rahim Masha'i … from the position of first vice president, you are hereby informed that in 
accordance with article 57 of the constitution, the instructions contained in your letter … have been carried 
out."[19] The brevity of the correspondence came close to expressing disrespect for the supreme leader. 
Moreover, while Article 57, which acknowledges the supervision of the supreme leader over all governmental 
affairs, is noted, Ahmadinejad did not mention any compliance on a religious or legal level, rendering his 
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correspondence merely an accompaniment to the attached resignation letter from Masha'i. 
The issue of Masha'i's appointment and dismissal is only a symptom of a broader malaise afflicting Iranian 
politics. His attempt to suggest a new démarche for Iranian foreign policy—and on such a sensitive issue—
while he was minister for tourism and cultural heritage was clearly misguided and can only have tainted his 
reputation from that time on. But his rapid turnaround and Ahmadinejad's measured defense of his views served 
to give him an extended career that only reached its crisis point following the 2009 elections. Nor were 
Masha'i's remarks about Israel the only matters that cast doubt on his ability to maintain the trust of the 
religious establishment, something that, in turn, cast doubt on Ahmadinejad's wisdom in appointing him in the 
first place. 
Real Power in Iran 
Political leadership in the Middle East has long been guided by patrimonial and patriarchal systems.[20] While 
this framework gives strength to the political system, it is this strength that also provides the weaknesses within 
a government that relies so heavily on such a system. An example of this simultaneous fortitude and frailty may 
be seen in the office of the supreme leader, who is central to all policies and programs. While governmental 
staff may advise, in the end all ideas are attributed to the leader, and any attempt to override his ultimate 
authority will result in the rapid deterioration of a plucky politician's career. Accordingly, if Khamenei in his 
capacity as supreme leader represents the hub of power, then Ahmadinejad depends on the patronage of 
Khamenei. Ahmadinejad in turn risks overstepping his mark at any point since the supreme leader holds real 
power and, to an extent, controls any future political success for Ahmadinejad. 
Given the close relationship between Ahmadinejad and Masha'i, it is questionable whether the impetus to 
remove him arose as a consequence of his not very important statements on Israeli-Iranian relations or whether 
it carried greater weight as an endeavor by the supreme leader to test the president's loyalty by compelling him 
to choose between his confidante and his master. Although Khamenei triumphed, some degree of uncertainty 
emerged from Ahmadinejad's lengthy hesitation. This in turn could prove conducive to a widening rift between 
the supreme leader and the president in an environment in which nobody is indispensable. Thus, the very 
system that Ahmadinejad thrives in could equally prove his downfall. 
Of particular interest is the military dimension. In the case of Iran, this chiefly means the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps or Sepah, the religious and governmental henchmen who have the power to silence restless 
citizens and enforce the whims of the authorities. Since Ahmadinejad took office, the IRGC has demonstrated a 
fickleness that showed it to be at first aligned with the president until the rift occurred between him and 
Khamenei. While opting for one over the other was inevitable, given that the IRGC owes its allegiance to the 
Islamic Republic, rather than to the president, Ahmadinejad nevertheless took a calculated risk; the IRGC had 
previously supported a number of his earlier political forays against Khamenei. 
This latest transgression, however, proved too much, and as Iran specialist James Bill and Middle East politics 
analyst Robert Springborg note, "When leadership rests so heavily upon the military reed, then it must be 
prepared to collapse whenever that reed breaks."[21] Buoyed by previous support, Ahmadinejad leaned on the 
reed of the IRGC with excessive confidence and since he ignored the supreme leader, clerics, and lay 
conservatives alike in his quest to sustain Masha'i's vice presidential role, the IRGC reed finally broke. 
Choosing the pen over the sword as a means for conveying the switch in allegiance, the political wing of the 
IRGC, the Sobh-e Sadeq, published an editorial criticizing Ahmadinejad and unmistakably supporting 
Khamenei in the Masha'i affair.[22] Although the military is a requisite in ensuring the durability of 
patrimonialist rule, it is fragile, meaning that leaders can be made or unmade at will. In placing too much faith 
in the mode of governance, Ahmadinejad jeopardized his rule and his future relations with the supreme 
leader—the repercussions of which will doubtless continue to damage him through what is left of his term in 
office. 
Ahmadinejad as Leader 
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As Ahmadinejad enters his second term under a cloud in the eyes of those outraged by the Masha'i affair, he 
must also contend with the wider discord engendered under his previous term. In recent years, global politics 
has been marked by the ascension of a series of charismatic leaders who invariably pledge salvation for ailing 
economies, unemployment levels, and domestic and regional security. Charismatic leaders emerge in times of 
upheaval, imbuing decaying political systems with a vitality that inspires optimism in an uneasy population. It 
is fitting, then, that as Ahmadinejad entered the initial presidential race for his first term, Iranian politics were 
ripe for an extraordinary leader. Ali Ansari, history professor at St. Andrews University, Scotland, U.K., 
observes that "for the purposes of popular consumption, the myth of charismatic autocracy had to be 
encouraged."[23] Upon becoming president, Ahmadinejad did bring a charisma that changed the tenor of 
Iranian politics. Appealing to young and old across the socioeconomic spectrum, he pledged to elevate Iran to 
new economic and political heights. Yet he was not alone in evoking a charismatic response since the 
endurance of patrimonialism necessitates new leaders to be attached to "charismatic leaders [who] were 
accorded supernatural status,"[24]—in this instance Ayatollah Khamenei. 
Nevertheless, charisma conceals its own fissures; it does not evolve but is forged in periods of crisis or rapid 
change. For charismatic leadership to endure from one leader to the next, it must conform to a process, whereby 
successive holders of the charismatic office do so in a formalized fashion, like the popes or the early caliphs.
[25] This in turn results in a self-contradictory evolution. According to Max Weber, the early twentieth-century 
German political economist and sociologist, pure charismatic authority lacks permanence, and thus the very 
elements that made the original charismatic leadership dynamic now become enshrined within the bureaucratic 
or patrimonial system. The fresh, original charisma becomes routinized in a more urbane form of leadership. 
Moreover, the effects of charismatic leadership are questionable: Impersonal, institutional charisma is a basic 
requirement for organizational stability,[26] and Ahmadinejad has shown a talent for original charisma, yet 
enters his second term with a much destabilized administration. 
The Iranian economy is in a terminal state, yet the only salvation for it would involve casualties—in this 
instance in the form of the Iranian employment market. Of course, Ahmadinejad has not been spared his portion 
of the blame for the economic malaise; his inability to stop spending during the oil price boom resulted in a 
departure from rational economic policies and the pursuance of policy by decree that resulted in "the exercise of 
a royal prerogative which would put the shah to shame."[27] As a result, Ahmadinejad squandered not only the 
Iranian coffers but also the confidence of the population. Lurching from bad to worse, the damage inflicted on 
the economy under Ahmadinejad reinforces the reality that the controversy arising over the appointment and 
dismissal of Masha'i is but the tip of a crisis-infused iceberg and that the decline in relations between 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei could be the pressure that will finally break the system within this presidential 
term. 
Conclusion 
The tenth presidential elections represented a new chapter in Iran's intense intra-elite dispute. No one outside or 
inside Iran can predict the ultimate outcome. One thing has become abundantly clear: Ahmadinejad's reliance 
on paramilitary forces to support him in bringing about velayat- e ummat (guardianship of the people) has given 
way to Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the clergy), the doctrinal principle on which the 
current system rests. In this context, Khamenei is not obliged to uphold international norms of human rights but 
to help erect a pure and authentic Islamic government while conforming Shari'a to Iran's political and social 
setting. The removal of Masha'i demonstrated, once more, that the real decision-maker in Iran is the supreme 
leader and not the president. Blaming Iran's problems on Ahmadinejad would lead us in a dangerous direction 
by suggesting that those problems will go away when he is finally driven out of office. 
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